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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court arises under section 78-2-2(5) of the Utah Code 
(1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Did the Court of Appeals properly rule that pursuant to Utah's 
Recording Act, Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. is the owner of the property at issue 
where it purchased the property in good faith and for valuable consideration and 
properly recorded its interest in the Utah County Recorder's Office nearly a decade 
before Salt Lake County recorded its interest? 
ISSUE #2: Is Metro West Ready, Mix, Inc. the owner of the property at 
issue on the alternative ground of adverse possession where it paid all taxes on the 
property and openly possessed and exclusively used the property for a continuos 
period in excess of seven years? 
A trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.2d 876 (Utah 2001). Both 
issues were fully briefed and argued before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §§57-3-101; 57-3-102(1); and 57-3-103 ("Recording 
Act"). [Attached as Addendum "B" to Appellant's Brief] 
1 
2. Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-8; 78-12-9; 78-12-12; 78-12-13 ("Adverse 
Possession Act"). [Attached as Addendum "A" to Appellees' Brief] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1989, Metro West Ready Mix, Inc. ("Metro West"), through its 
predecessor in interest, paid $25,000 to purchase a parcel of real property located in 
Utah County on the west side of 1-15 near the point of the mountain. Metro West 
purchased the property from Darhl and Roena Tingey whose family had owned and 
used the property and much of the land surrounding it for many decades as part of 
their family's farming operation. The property's northern border is the Utah 
County/Salt Lake County line and its western border is the Rio Grande Railroad. 
The remainder of the property is bordered by Metro West's gravel pit operation. 
Immediately after it purchased the property in 1989, Metro West recorded its deed 
in the Utah County Recorder's Office. From that time forward, Metro West paid all 
taxes assessed on the property, and continually and openly used the property as part 
of its gravel pit operation. This property has been referred to in this case as "Parcel 
G" and this case is about the ownership of Parcel G. 
In 1999, Salt Lake County (the "County") filed this lawsuit, claiming that it 
owned Parcel G pursuant to an 1878 deed and that Metro West's purchase of Parcel 
G ten years earlier was invalid. The County admits that it did not record its 
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purported deed to Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until more than 
nine years after Metro West recorded its deed and over 120 years after the County 
purportedly obtained its deed. Until 1998, there was no indication on Parcel G or in 
the Utah County Recorder's Office that the County had any ownership interest in 
Parcel G. 
Following discovery, Metro West filed a motion for summary judgment 
asserting that it was the rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Recording 
Act and, alternatively, on the basis of adverse possession. On February 26, 2001, 
the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler granted Metro West's Motion pursuant to the 
Recording Act and, thus, did not reach the issue of adverse possession. [R. at 296-
97.] On August 1, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed Judge 
Peuler's grant of summary judgment in Metro West's favor. Salt Lake County v. 
Metro Waste Ready Mix, Inc., et. al. (No. 20010276-CA) 2002 UT App. 257, 53 
P.3d 499. The Court of Appeals opinion is cited herein as "Op., % ". 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Metro West set forth several 
numbered paragraphs of undisputed fact. [R. at 83-86.] The County did not dispute 
any of Metro West's facts as required by Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of 
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Judicial Administration. The same facts are set forth herein, in relevant part, with 
citations to the record. 
1. Metro West, through its predecessor in interest, Lamona Farms, 
purchased Parcel G, which was comprised of farm and grazing land, from Dahrl and 
Roena Tingey on April 14, 1989 for $25,000. Lamona Farms promptly recorded its 
deed to Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office. [R. at 97-100, 106, 127.] 
Parcel G is located in Utah County near the point of the mountain. [R. at 127.] 
2. During negotiations to purchase Parcel G, the Tingey family 
represented to the owners of Lamona Farms, Dr. Paul Richards and Dr. David 
Nelson, that the Tingey family had owned, used, and maintained Parcel G since the 
turn of the century as part of their family farming operations near the point of the 
mountain. [R. at 102, 104-05.] 
3. Lamona Farms purchased and recorded its interest in Parcel G with the 
assistance of a title company. The title company reviewed the records from the 
Utah County Recorder's Office regarding Parcel G and reported to Dr. Richards and 
Dr. Nelson that there were no conflicts with the Tingey family's representations 
regarding Parcel G. [R. at 102-03.] Additionally, Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson 
personally reviewed records obtained from the Utah County Recorder's Office and 
examined the property and determined that there were no conflicts with respect to 
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the Tingey family's representations regarding their longstanding use and ownership 
of Parcel G. [R. at 100-01.] 
4. In April 1991, all of the property Lamona Farms acquired at the point 
of the mountain, including Parcel G, was transferred by deed from Lamona Farms 
to Monterra Rock Products, Inc. ("Monterra Rock"). [R. at 106, 128-30.] In 1993, 
Monterra Rock merged into Metro West. [R. at 107-08.] Neither Lamona Farms, 
Monterra Rock, nor Metro West had any knowledge whatsoever of the County's 
claimed ownership interest in Parcel G prior to June 1998. [R. at 119-20.] 
5. The County did not record its deed to Parcel G in the Utah County 
Recorder's Office until June 1998, more than 120 years after it purportedly acquired 
Parcel G. [R. at 131, 133, 138-40.] 
6. Prior to the County's recording of its purported deed in June 1998, 
there was no indication of any kind in the Utah County Recorder's Office that the 
County claimed any ownership interest in Parcel G. [R. at 141-43.] 
7. From at least 1989 through 1998, the County did not perform any 
activity on Parcel G. The County has never posted any sign, performed any 
improvement or given any other indication on Parcel G evidencing its purported 
ownership of the property. [R. at 136-37.] In fact, the County is unaware of 
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whether any of its employees or agents ever set foot on Parcel G at anytime 
between 1990 and June 1998. [R. at 134-35.] 
8. From the time it acquired Parcel G in 1989, Metro West (and its 
predecessors in interest), exclusively, continuously and openly used the property as 
part of Metro West's gravel pit operation. Metro West began excavating and 
drilling holes on Parcel G in 1990 and conducting sample testing of the 
underground materials. To perform this work, Metro West bulldozed rough roads 
into the property, enlarged existing roads, and repeatedly took heavy drilling and 
excavating equipment onto the property. This and other activity on Parcel G 
occurred regularly over the next several years. [R. at 108-13, 116-18, 121-26.] 
9. At the point of the mountain where Parcel G is located, there are 
numerous operating gravel pits. Parcel G is a landlocked parcel of property, 
substantially bordered by the remainder of Metro West's gravel pit and generally 
surrounded by other gravel mining operations. At all relevant times, the only 
vehicle access to Parcel G was through Metro West's gravel pit operation where 
Metro West had numerous signs indicating its ownership. [R. at 145-47.] 
10. Metro West and its predecessors in interest paid all taxes assessed on 
Parcel G each year from 1990 through 1999. [R. at 114-15, 145-57.] 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court of Appeals correctly held that Metro West is the owner of Parcel 
G. Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith and for fair market value; it duly 
recorded its deed with the Utah County Recorder's Office; it paid all taxes assessed 
on Parcel G; and it used the property openly and continuously as part of its gravel 
pit operations. The County, on the other hand, failed to record its purported deed to 
Parcel G in the Utah County Recorder's Office until nearly nine years after Metro 
West recorded its deed and over 120 years after the County purportedly obtained 
title to Parcel G. From at least 1989 through 1998, the County failed to use the 
property in any manner; failed to post any notice or indication of its ownership on 
the property, and failed to give Metro West any indication that the County claimed 
any ownership interest in Parcel G. 
Utah is a race-notice state and the burden is on a property owner to record its 
deed in the county in which the property is located. If a subsequent party purchases 
the property in good faith and for valuable consideration and records its deed prior 
to the first party recording its deed, Utah law holds that the first party's deed is void 
as to the subsequent purchaser and the property belongs to the subsequent 
purchaser. That is precisely what occurred in this case. As the Court of Appeals 
held, Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith and for valuable consideration 
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and recorded its deed in the Utah County Recorder's Office nearly a decade before 
the County recorded its purported deed. Metro West is the owner of Parcel G 
pursuant to Utah's Recording Act. 
Even if this Court were to hold that Utah's Recording Act did not apply in 
this case, it should nevertheless uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in Metro West's favor on the alternative basis of adverse possession. The parties 
fully briefed and argued the issue of adverse possession to the trial court and the 
Court of Appeals. The statutory elements of adverse possession are met in this 
case. Metro West purchased Parcel G nearly ten years prior to receiving any notice 
of the County's purported interest. Metro West duly recorded its deed in the Utah 
County Recorder's Office, paid all assessed taxes on Parcel G, and openly and 
exclusively used Parcel G as a part of its ongoing gravel pit operation. Metro West 
is the owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Adverse Possession Act. 
The recording requirements and the doctrine of adverse possession are well 
established in Utah. The County, as a substantial property owner, an assessor of 
property taxes, and an entity specifically charged with preserving, cataloging, and 
controlling documents reflecting property rights and ownership, is acutely aware of 
these statutes and of its obligation to properly record and maintain its own 
property. In this case, the County failed for over 120 years to properly record its 
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purported ownership of Parcel G and further failed to provide notice of any kind on 
Parcel G of its purported interest. The County should not be rewarded and Metro 
West should not be harshly and inequitably penalized because of the County's 
admitted failure to comply with clear, statutory requirements. 
ARGUMENT 
I. METRO WEST IS THE OWNER OF PARCEL G PURSUANT TO 
UTAH'S RECORDING ACT. 
Section 57-3-103 of the Utah Code provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
Effect of Failure to Record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as 
against any subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any 
portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good 
faith and for a valuable consideration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser's document is first duly recorded. 
This Court has held that the purpose of Utah's Recording Act is to "protect 
the purchaser's interest" against the asserted but unrecorded interest of a third 
party. Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987) (internal 
citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Higlev. 989 P.2d 61, 70 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) 
("[t]he recording statute's purpose is to provide a method by which a transferee can 
protect himself) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, "an innocent purchaser, 
9 
having no notice of liens or adverse claims not disclosed by the records in the 
manner prescribed by the statute, will hold land as against such claims and liens." 
Higley, 989 P.2d at 70 (citing 66 Am.Jur.2d Records and Recording Laws § 48 
(1973)) (emphasis added). 
Pursuant to section 57-3-107 of the Utah Code, a prior deed is void as 
against a subsequent purchaser such as Metro West where the subsequent 
purchaser (1) purchased the property for valuable consideration; (2) acted in good 
faith; and (3) recorded its deed first. Although not set forth in the statute, Utah 
courts have held that an inherent element of good faith is that the subsequent 
purchaser take title to the property "without notice of a prior, unrecorded interest in 
the property." [Op., \ 6, citing Ault v. Holden, 44 P.2d 781, 791 (Utah 2002) 
("Between two purchasers of real property, the first to validly record a conveyance 
and take the property without notice of a prior interest in the property takes the 
property over a purchaser who subsequently records a deed.").] 
In this case, the County does not dispute that Metro West complied with 
points (1) and (3) above. Metro West paid valuable consideration to purchase 
Parcel G and recorded its deed nine years prior to the date the County recorded its 
deed. The County contends, however, that Metro West did not act in good faith in 
purchasing Parcel G from the Tingey family because (1) the Tingey family did not 
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hold "legal title" to Parcel G at the time they sold the property to Metro West; and 
(2) Metro West was on "inquiry notice" of the County's interest and should have 
conducted a more aggressive investigation which would have permitted Metro 
West to discover the County's purported but unrecorded ownership of Parcel G. 
The County's position does not comport with Utah law or the undisputed 
facts of this case. First, as the Court of Appeals held, the County's "legal title" 
approach contradicts the plain language of Utah's Recording Act. The issue in this 
case is not whether the Tingey family held legal title to Parcel G but whether 
Metro West believed in good faith that the Tingey family owned Parcel G when 
Metro West purchased it. Second, Metro West acted in good faith and did not have 
actual or constructive notice that the County, rather than the Tingey family, 
purportedly owned Parcel G. It is undisputed that there was no evidence in the 
Utah County Recorder's Office or on Parcel G indicating that anyone other than 
the Tingey family owned the property. It is undisputed that no amount of 
investigation on the property or in the Utah County Recorder's Office would have 
disclosed the County's unrecorded interest in Parcel G. 
Metro West purchased Parcel G for valuable consideration in good faith and 
without notice of the County's competing claim and recorded its deed first. Metro 
West is the owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Recording Act. 
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A. As the Court of Appeals Held, the County's "Legal Title" 
Approach Contradicts the Plain Language of Utah's Recording 
Act. 
The County contends that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Utah's 
Recording Act in this case because the Tingey family did not hold "legal title" to 
Parcel G when they sold Parcel G to Metro West. The County claims that a party 
cannot, as a matter of law, be a good faith purchaser without notice where its 
grantor did not have legal title to the property. As the Court of Appeals held, the 
County's approach contradicts the plain language of Utah's Recording Act. 
The hornbook example of a race-notice statute property dispute involving 
dual claims of ownership over a single piece of property arises where "A" sells a 
piece of property to "B" and then later sells the same piece of property to "C." In 
that situation, if C purchases the property from A in good faith, without notice of 
B's purchase, and for valuable consideration, and then records his deed before B 
records his deed, C will own the property over B. The fact that A did not hold 
"legal title" to the property when it sold the property to C (because A had already 
sold the property to B) is irrelevant under the statute where C purchased the 
property in good faith. As this Court has repeatedly held, the purpose of Utah's 
Recording Act is to protect good faith purchasers such as C. See, e^ g,, Horman, 
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744 P.2d at 1016; Higley, 989 P.2d at 70. The issue under Utah's Recording Act is 
good faith - not "legal title." 
B. Metro West Purchased Parcel G in Good Faith and Without 
Actual or Constructive Notice that the County Purportedly 
Owned Parcel G. 
Recognizing that the County's position contradicts the plain language of 
Utah's Recording Act, but at the same time wanting to limit situations where fraud 
could occur, the Court of Appeals analyzed this case under the "apparent title" 
approach which places additional emphasis on whether the subsequent purchaser 
had notice that someone other than the grantor owned the property. [Op., ffljll, 
12.] The apparent title approach clarifies the "notice" element of the good faith 
requirement in Utah's Recording Act by providing that "the purchaser must take 
title without notice that the grantor is in fact not the owner."1 The Court of 
Appeals held that in making this determination, a court must first look to the 
records in the county recorder's office of the county where the property is located. 
[Op., Tj 15, citing Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1).] Where the records are silent 
1
 The Court of Appeals approach does not change the law in Utah or 
contradict Utah's Recording Act as the County claims. The approach merely 
suggests additional factors (all of which are set forth in prior opinions of this Court 
interpreting Utah's Recording Act) that a court should consider when determining 
whether a subsequent purchaser acted in good faith. Rather than encouraging 
fraudulent land transactions, as the County claims, the approach provides 
additional teeth to Utah's Recording Act by requiring that a subsequent purchaser 
conduct a more thorough examination by a subsequent purchaser. 
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regarding ownership, as in this case, a court should examine other indices of 
ownership, including: (1) whether the purported owner possessed the property, 
Ault v. Holden, 44 P.2d 781, 792-93 (Utah 2002); (2) whether there was any 
activity or indication on the property that would raise questions as to who owned 
the property, First American Title Insurance Company v. J.B. Ranch. Incorporated. 
966 P.2d 834, 838 (Utah 1998); and (3) the representations of the purported owner 
of the property. Pender v. Bird. 224 P.2d 1057,1059 (Utah 1950). 
Applying Utah's Recording Act and the case law interpreting it as set forth 
above, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Metro West purchased Parcel G in 
good faith and without notice that the County, rather than the Tingey family, 
purportedly owned Parcel G. 
It is undisputed that when Metro West purchased Parcel G in 1989, there 
was no indication in the Utah County Recorder's Office that the County claimed 
any ownership interest in Parcel G. [R. at 141-43.] The County did not file its 
purported deed until 1998, nearly 120 years after it purportedly acquired Parcel G. 
It is further undisputed that at the time Metro West purchased Parcel G in 1989, 
there was no indication on Parcel G or the surrounding property that would have 
given Metro West any inkling that the County or anyone other than the Tingey 
family owned any interest in Parcel G. [R. at 134-37.] 
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In the spring of 1989, Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson, the two owners of 
Metro West's predecessor in interest, Lamona Farms, approached the Tingey 
family regarding purchasing Parcel G.2 At that time, the Tingey family was using 
Parcel G along with other farmland they owned near the point of the mountain. [R. 
at 102-05.] The Tingey family represented to Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson that 
they had owned and used Parcel G since before the turn of the century. [Id.] 
Prior to purchasing Parcel G, Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson hired a title 
company to review the Utah County records to determine whether any party other 
than the Tingey family had any ownership interest in Parcel G. The title company 
confirmed that there were no conflicts with the Tingey family's representations. 
[R. at 102-03.] Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson also personally reviewed the Utah 
County Records and Parcel G and found nothing to contradict the representations 
the Tingey family made regarding their longstanding ownership and use of Parcel 
G. [Rat 100-01.] 
In its Brief, the County claims that Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson were 
sophisticated commercial land owners and developers at the time they purchased 
Parcel G. This is false. Although they had previously purchased additional 
farmland from the Tingey family near the point of the mountain for use as a sod 
farm, Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson were certainly not sophisticated commercial 
land developers. [R. at 102-05,146, 236.] 
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Despite the undisputed facts set forth above, the County claims that Metro 
West should have been charged with "constructive notice" of the County's 
unrecorded interest in Parcel G. The County's position miscomprehends Utah law. 
There are two types of constructive notice under Utah law: 
One kind of constructive notice is notice which results from a record 
or which is imputed by the recording statutes; and the other is notice 
which is presumed because of the fact that a person has knowledge of 
certain facts which should impart to him, or lead him to, knowledge of 
the ultimate fact. 
First American Title, 966 P.2d at 837. The first type of constructive notice arises 
from Utah's Recording Act, which provides that documents and instruments filed 
with the proper county recorder "'impart notice to all persons of their contents.'" 
Id., quoting Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-102(1). Records or deeds filed in other 
locations, however, do not impart constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser as 
a matter of law. See, e^ g,, Stringer v. Young, 28 U.S. 320 (1830) (holding that 
recording a deed in a "wrong county" is "fatal"); Honaker Lumber Co., Inc. v. 
Kiser, 113 S.E.718, 722 (Va. 1922) (holding that where a deed was recorded in the 
wrong county, a subsequent purchaser for value had no notice and "held legal title 
to the land"); Hays v. Pumphrev, 125 S.W. 1109, 1111 (Mo. 1910) ("the record of 
a deed only imparts notice to subsequent purchasers when the deed is recorded in 
the county where the land is situate"). 
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This Court explained the rationale for this bright-line rule of constructive 
notice in First American Title. In First American Title, the defendant argued that 
the plaintiff should have been on constructive notice of potentially adverse claims 
because, although there were no records filed in the county recorder's office, 
public maps filed with the county clerk indicated roads crossing the subject 
property. The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff title 
company, and held that although the maps were filed with the county clerk, the 
maps did not impart constructive notice because they were not filed with the 
county recorder's office. The Court stated, "[t]he salutariness of the recording 
statute is that it provides stability and certainty to land titles on which purchasers 
must rely." Id at 839. 
The holding of First American Title applies in this case. The only record 
indicating the County's purported ownership interest in Parcel G was the deed the 
County filed with the Salt Lake County Recorder's office. As a matter of law, 
Metro West was not on constructive notice of, and had no duty to research, public 
records located outside the Utah County Recorder's Office. 
The second type of constructive notice is referred to as "inquiry notice." In 
First American Title, this Court held that inquiry notice arises from "knowledge of 
certain facts and circumstances that are sufficient to give rise to a duty to inquire 
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further;" the Court specifically stated that inquiry notice "does not arise from 
records." 966 P.2d at 838 (emphasis added). 
The Court in First American Title emphasized this point by explaining the 
holding in Salt Lake, Garfield & West Railway v. Allied Materials Co., 291 P.2d 
883 (Utah 1955). In Allied Materials, a railroad company claimed a right-of-way 
over the defendant's land. Although the actual deed was not recorded, "there were 
railroad poles, guy wires, and trolley wires that encroached upon the defendant's 
land." Id at 884. On the basis of these facts, the Court held that the defendant was 
on inquiry notice of the railway's claim. Id at 886. The Court in First American 
Title, stated that "Allied Materials shows that inquiry notice arises from knowledge 
of certain facts and circumstances [i.e. encroachments and activities on the 
property], not from records." 996 P.2d at 838 (emphasis added). See also 
Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983) (holding that no "further 
investigation" is required where there is no "evidence that there was any activity 
on the property at [the time of the conveyance] which would have reasonably 
alerted" a party to any potentially adverse claims); Granada, Inc. v. Cinnamon 
Ridge, Ltd., 92 B.R. 501, 506 (I). Utah 1988) (applying Utah's doctrine of inquiry 
notice and holding that "[u]nless there is activity apparent upon inspection 'which 
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would have reasonably alerted' a purchaser of [any adverse claim to the property], 
no inquiry need by made"). 
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time Metro West purchased Parcel G 
from the Tingey family there was no activity on Parcel G that was in any way 
adverse to the Tingey family's representations regarding their longstanding 
ownership, possession and use of the property. [R. at 102-05.] Acknowledging 
this, the only "evidence" the County points to as purportedly placing Metro West 
on inquiry notice is the fact that the Tingey family gave Metro West a quitclaim 
deed to Parcel G rather than a warranty deed. [See Aplt's Brief at 18.] The 
County's argument is again misplaced. 
Numerous courts have held that a grantee under a quitclaim deed is a bona 
fide purchaser without notice and is entitled to the full protection of the recording 
laws. See Aiken v. Lane, 92 P.2d 628, 631 (Mont. 1939) citing 23 R.C.L. 242 
(stating that "the tendency of modern decisions is uniformly in favor of the rule 
that the holder of a quitclaim deed is entitled to the same protection as one under a 
warranty deed); see also Virginia Highland Civic Assoc, v. Paces Properties. Inc., 
550 S.E.2d 128, 130 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) ("a purchaser who takes a quitclaim deed 
without notice and for value is entitled to the protection which the law affords a 
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bona fide purchaser for value and without notice"); Williams v. McCann, 385 P.2d 
788, 791 (Okla. 1963) ("a purchaser under a quitclaim deed is a bona fide one").3 
Moreover, the fact that Metro West received a quitclaim deed certainly did 
not place it on inquiry notice of the County's purported interest nor did it somehow 
impose a duty on Metro West to review records improperly filed in another county. 
See First American Title, 966 P.2d at 838 (holding that a party is only on inquiry 
notice of information where known facts or circumstances would have led him to 
discover that information). The simple fact is, if the County had followed Utah 
law and properly recorded its deed, this dispute would not exist. Metro West 
should no be punished and the County rewarded for the County's clear failure.4 
During discussions regarding the purchase of Parcel G, the Tingey family 
represented to Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson that when the State of Utah staked its 
section markers, it started at the south and north ends of the State and eventually 
met on Parcel G and the surrounding property with a 1000 foot discrepancy. The 
Tingey family represented they could only provide a quitclaim deed because of this 
discrepancy. Dr. Richards and Dr. Nelson confirmed this information with Utah 
County and found that there were no conflicts whatsoever with the Tingey family's 
representations. [R. at 101-02.] 
4
 In its Brief, the County, in hindsight, nit-picks at things it apparently 
believes Metro West could have done to somehow discover the County's mistake 
and then claims that Metro West is not a good faith purchaser because it did not do 
these things. For example, the County claims that Metro West was not a good faith 
purchaser because it did not retain a lawyer to assist in its purchase of Parcel G. 
While we as lawyers may believe we are indispensable to every transaction, we are 
not. Parties may enter into deals without the aid of an attorney and doing so does 
not indicate bad faith or lack of diligence. The County also claims that Metro 
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Metro West purchased Parcel G in good faith and without actual or 
contractive knowledge of the County's purported but unrecorded interest. Metro 
West's predecessor in interest, with the assistance of a title company, could find 
nothing in the Utah County records that conflicted with the Tingey family's 
representations. There was also no indication on Parcel G or the surrounding 
property that would have placed Metro West on inquiry notice of the County's 
claim and certainly nothing that would have led Metro West to research documents 
located in another county. Metro West is the rightful owner of Parcel G pursuant 
to Utah's Recording Act. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, METRO WEST IS THE OWNER OF 
PARCEL G PURSUANT TO UTAH'S ADVERSE POSSESSION ACT. 
Even if this Court were to hold that the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled 
that Metro West is the owner of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Recording Act, the 
West did not obtain the aid of a professional title company in purchasing Parcel G. 
This is simply false. It is undisputed that Metro West purchased Parcel G with the 
assistance of a title company and the title company conducted a review of the 
records and reported no conflicts with the Tingey's representations regarding 
ownership and certainly reported no indication of any ownership interest by the 
County. [R. at 102-03.] Indeed, the County has admitted that prior to 1998, Metro 
West "would not have found any record connecting the County to Parcel G in Utah 
County." [R. at 179.] The simple fact is no amount of inspection or investigation 
of Parcel G itself or of the records at the Utah County Recorder's Office would 
have provided notice to Metro West because there was no notice of any kind on 
Parcel G or in the Utah County Recorder's Office of the County's purported 
ownership interest. 
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Court should nevertheless uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
Metro West's favor on the alternative ground that Metro West obtained ownership 
of Parcel G through adverse possession. In Utah, "[i]t is well-settled that an 
appellate court may affirm a trial court's ruling on any proper grounds, even though 
the trial court relied on some other ground." DeBry v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 
(Utah 1995); see also Dipoma v. McPhie. 1 P.3d 564, 566 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
(an appellate court "may affirm a lower court's ruling on any alternative ground 
even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis 
of its ruling") (internal quotations omitted). The issue of adverse possession was 
fully briefed and presented to the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As set forth 
below, Metro West has met the statutory elements of adverse possession under 
Utah law and is the rightful owner of Parcel G. 
A. Metro West Has Established the Elements of Adverse Possession. 
Under Utah law, a party who occupies and possesses property under a claim 
of title based on a written instrument for a continuous period of seven years and 
pays all taxes assessed on the property during that period is deemed to have 
adversely possessed the property. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-8, -12.5 
A copy of the relevant sections of the Utah Code on adverse possession are 
attached as Addendum "A" to this Brief. 
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Section 78-12-9 of the Utah Code states that property is deemed to have 
been possessed where it has been "usually cultivated or improved" or where "it has 
been used" . . . "for the ordinary use of the occupant." This Court has defined 
"ordinary use of the occupant" as "use appropriate to location and character of 
property." Day v. Steele, 184 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1947). Applying this standard, 
this Court has held that a defendant obtained adverse possession to a parcel of 
property where it occupied the property by allowing its sheep to openly graze "for 
a period of about three weeks each year" for sufficient years under the statute. 
Cooper v.Carter Oil Co., 316 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah 1957). 
After it acquired Parcel G in 1989, Metro West paid all taxes assessed on the 
property until it sold the property in 1999. [R. at 114-15, 145-57.] In 1989, Metro 
West incorporated Parcel G into its adjoining land and thereafter used the entire 
tract of land exclusively as part of Metro West's gravel pit operation. [R. at 108-
13, 116-18, 121-26.] At all times, Parcel G was exclusively controlled by Metro 
West and was held out to the public as a part of Metro West's ongoing gravel pit 
operation. [R. at 145-47.] Beginning in 1990 and continuing thereafter, Metro 
West improved Parcel G by bulldozing numerous access roads across the property 
and excavating and drilling numerous holes on Parcel G and conducting regular 
sample testing of the underground materials. [R. at 108-13,116-18, 121-26.] 
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As set forth above, in response to the fact section in Metro West's Motion 
for Summary Judgment the County failed to set forth a statement of facts it claims 
are in dispute as Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
requires. Accordingly, Metro West's properly supported facts should be deemed 
admitted for purposes of summary judgment and this appeal. Those facts establish 
the statutory elements of adverse possession and make clear that Metro West is the 
owner of Parcel G.6 
B. Parcel G Was Not Designated for Public Use. 
In prior briefing, the County claimed that Metro West did not obtaine Parcel 
G through adverse possession because Utah law prohibits the adverse possession of 
land owned by a governmental entity. The County is incorrect. Section 78-12-13 
of the Utah Code provides that a party may not adversely possess government 
In its opposition memorandum to Metro West's Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted to the trial court, the County briefly referenced two cases -
Day v. Steele, 184 P.2d 216 (Utah 1947) and Riter v. Cavias, 431 P.2d 788 (Utah 
1967) - where Utah courts refused to find adverse possession and which the 
County argued were analogous to the present action. In both cases, however, the 
ruling court specifically found that the use by the party seeking adverse possession 
was not "exclusive." For example, in Day, the court found that third parties 
regularly stored junk on the property, camped on the property, and generally used 
the property as a right of way such that there was no notice that any party was 
claiming ownership of the property. 184 P.2d at 219-20. See also Riter, 431 P.2d 
at 789 (plaintiff failed to show "exclusive possession and/or use of the land"). It is 
undisputed in this case that Metro West continually and exclusively used Parcel G 
as part of its ongoing gravel pit operation. [R. at 108-13, 116-18, 121-26.] 
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owned property only where that property has been "designated for public use." 
(Emphasis added). 
In Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. v. Board of Education of Salt Lake City, 
99 P. 150 (Utah 1909), the Court considered whether land previously used for a 
public school could be adversely possessed when the land's use as a public school 
was discontinued. The Court examined this issue under Section 2866x, Comp. 
Law 1907, which closely mirrors the language of Section 78-12-13. See id at 153. 
The Court held that while an exception to adverse possession applies to 
government entities, "the exception only applies to property which is devoted to a 
special public use." Id The Court further stated that while government entities 
"may hold real property not specifically devoted to public use," they hold such 
property "in a capacity not necessarily governmental" and "[t]o property so held 
the exception does not apply." Id The Court concluded that since the property 
was no longer used for a specific public purpose, and had not been for a number of 
years, the property could be adversely possessed. Id 
The County has not, and cannot, produce any evidence that Parcel G has 
been dedicated to any public use. In fact, the County's 30(b)(6) witness testified 
that the only thing he could recall regarding the property was that in 1998 (after the 
relevant time period) the County conducted "very" preliminary discussions about 
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some type of trail system but that "[njothing took place" beyond these very 
preliminary discussions. [R. at 288-91.] Because Parcel G was never dedicated 
for public use, section 78-12-13 does not apply. Metro West is the rightful owner 
of Parcel G pursuant to Utah's Adverse Possession Act. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the Court of Appeals' 
affirmance of the trial court's decision granting summary judgment in Metro 
West's favor. 
DATED t h i s / ^ day of March, 2003. 
HATCH, JAMES & DODGE 
By: A 
Mark & Clements 
Mark H.\Richards 
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postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing to: 
David E. Yocum 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
Don Hansen 
Deputy District Attorney 
2001 South State Street, No. S3400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
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Addendum 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-8 
78-12-8. Under written instrument or judgment. 
Whenever it appears that the occupant, or those under whom he claims, 
entered into possession of the property under claim of title, exclusive of other 
right, founding such claim upon a written instrument as being a conveyance of 
the property in question, or upon the decree or judgment of a competent court, 
and that there has been a continued occupation and possession of the property 
included in such instrument, decree or judgment, or of some part of the 
property under such claim, for seven years, the property so included is deemed 
to have been held adversely, except that when the property so included consists 
of a tract divided into lots, the possession of one lot is not deemed a possession 
of any other lot of the same tract. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Supp., 104-12-8. 
Cross-References. — Marketable record 
title, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Commencement of running of statute. 




Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
"Open" and "continuous* possession. 








— Sales contract. 
Performance of conditions. 
Commencement of running of statute* 
— Invasion of true owner's rights. 
In action for possession of land, statute of 
limitations does not begin to run until true 
owner's right of possession has been so invaded 
as to give rise to cause of action so that where 
true owner's right to possession of land had not 
been so disturbed or encroached upon, statute 
did not begin to run. Scott v. Hansen, 18 Utah 
2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966). 
— Minors. 
Seven-year period for adverse possession be-
gan to run upon delivery of the so-called guard-
ian's deed executed after the wards attained 




This statute does not run between cotenants 
unless and until there is manifested a determi-
nation on the part of one in possession to 
exclude the other cotenants. Memmott v. Bosh, 
520 R2d 1342 (Utah 1974). 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
Statutory methods of acquiring title by ad-
verse possession, set out in former §§ 104-2-7 
to 104-2-12, were held to be exclusive. Jenkins 
v. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 P.2d 871 (1948). 
"Open* and "continuous* possession* 
— Blacksmith shop. 
Evidence held to show that possession of lot 
by defendant as yard in connection with his 
blacksmith shop was of continuous and open 
character required by statute for title by pos-
session under color of title. Bingham Livery & 
Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37 Utah 457,110 P. 56 
(1910). 
Interruption. 
Where defendant, in possession of lot used as 
yard in connection with his blacksmith shop, 
permitted teamsters, peddlers, and others who 
had occasion to do so to use it as campground 
when such usage did not interfere with hip own 
use and occupation of lot, held, occasional driv-
ing over ground used as yard in going to and 
coming from barn was not interference with, or 
interruption of, defendant's adverse possession. 
Bingham Livery & Transf. Co. v. McDonald, 37 
Utah 457, 110 P. 56 (1910). 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-12-9 
78-12-9. What constitutes adverse possession under writ-
ten instrument. 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession by any person 
claiming a title founded upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, 
land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases: 
(1) Where it has been usually cultivated or improved. 
(2) Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure. 
(3) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, 
or of fencing timber, for the purpose of husbandry, or for pasturage or for 
the ordinary use of the occupant. 
(4) Where a known farm or single lot has been partly improved, the 
portion of such farm or lot that may have been left not cleared or not 
inclosed according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining county 
is deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part 
improved and cultivated. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-9, 
Cross-References. — Agricultural Code, 
Title 4. 
Marketable record title, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Ancient, unrecorded deed. 
Applicability of section. 
— Easement by prescription. 
Efficacy of section. 
Evidence of adverse possession. 
— Sufficient. 
Exclusiveness of statutory methods. 
Grazing. 
— Grazing season. 
Suitable lands. 
Use part of year. 
— Prima facie case. 
Inclosure or occupancy. 
Invalid tax deed. 
—Actual possession. 
Notice to owner. 
"Ordinary use of the occupant." 
— Holding land for speculation. 
— Not found. 
"Substantial inclosure.w 
— Found. 
"Usually cultivated or improved." 
Cited. 
Ancient, unrecorded deed. 
One claiming under ancient deed never re-
corded, and over thirty years' adverse posses-
sion of land, during which improvements were 
made and taxes paid, established title as 
against one claiming under deed from heirs and 
administrator of grantor's estate, but never 
delivered, which was based upon assumption 
that title was still in grantor at time of his 
death, and who paid no taxes, never held pos-
session, and claimed no rights in land until just 
prior to filing suit to quiet title. Perry v. Perry, 
67 Utah 45, 245 P. 695 (1926). 
Applicability of section. 
— Easement by prescription. 
This section does not apply to private rights 
of way or to any other class of easement by 
prescription. It can only be applied by analogy. 
Where a person opens a way for the use of his 
own premises, and another person uses it also 
without causing damage, the presumption is, in 
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that 
such use by the latter was permissive, and not 
under claim of right. Harkness v. Woodmansee, 
7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891). 
Efficacy of section. 
The statute defining what shall constitute 
adverse possession is of same degree of efficacy 
as is the statute of frauds. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 
Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 1417 (1928). 
Evidence of adverse possession. 
— Sufficient. 
Where plaintiffs asserted title by written 
instrument and adverse possession, evidence 
that plaintiffs and their predecessors had paid 
all taxes for over thirty years and that the 
78-12-12 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse 
Possession §§ 28 to 38. 
C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 30 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Adverse possession based on en-
croachment of building or other structure, 2 
A.L.R.3d 1005. 
Grazing of livestock or gathering of natural 
crop as fulfilling traditional elements of ad-
verse possession, 48 A.L.R.3d 818. 
Use of property by public as affecting acqui-
sition of title by adverse possession, 56 
A.L.R.3d 1182. 
Key Numbers. — Adverse Possession &=> 19 
to 21. 
78-12-12* Possession must be continuous, and taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the 
provisions of any section of this code, unless it shall be shown that the land has 
been occupied and claimed for the period of seven years continuously, and that 
the party, his predecessors and grantors have paid all taxes which have been 
levied and assessed upon such land according to law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-12-12. 
Compiler's Notes* — This section is identi-
cal to former § 104-2-12 (Code 1943) which was 
repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Section 
104-2-12 was also amended by Laws 1951, ch. 
19, § 1; that provision is compiled as § 78-12-
12.1 herein. The Supreme Court held the 
amendment was valid despite the repeal of 
§ 104-2-12. 
Cross-References. — Marketable record 
title, § 57-9-1 et seq. 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-2-1303 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adverse possession. 
Applicability of section. 
Boundary by agreement. 
Boundary dispute. 














Running of statutory time limitation. 




Where claimant under claim of ownership 
went into actual possession of certain lots 
commenced to improve them, subsequently re-
ceiving deed from county, held possession was 
adverse, from time of entry, as to all the world 
except county. Welner v. Stearns, 40 Utah 185, 
120 P. 490, 1914C Ann. Cas. 1175 (1911). 
Open, notorious and hostile use and posses-
sion of the property and payment of taxes 
thereon, all under claim of right, will constitute 
adverse possession. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah 
258, 134 P. 1160 (1913). 
Where defendant and his predecessors had 
been in actual, open, and adverse possession of 
land for statutory period, and for seven succes-
sive years had paid taxes thereon, and they 
were inclosed, occupied, and cultivated, title 
was acquired by adverse possession. Pacific 
Land & Water Co. v. Hartsough, 50 Utah 581, 
168 P. 552 (1917). 
Applicability of section. 
This section does not apply to rights of way or 
to any other class of easement by prescription. 
It can only be applied by analogy. Harkness v. 
Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227, 26 P. 291 (1891). 
Where one claiming by adverse possession, 
before seven years necessary for such posses-
sion had run, commenced suit to quiet title 
against one claiming interest in land, held 
78-12-13 JUDICIAL CODE 
Occupying claimants, § 57-6-1 et seq. 
Tax sales, § 59-2-1303 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Tax title. 
— Claim of right. 
Judgment was properly entered for defen-
dants in a declaratory judgment action to de-
termine rights of parties to realty possessed by 
defendants under tax deed where plaintiffs had 
not been in possession of the realty for more 
than twelve years prior to the bringing of the 
ANALYSIS 
Establishment of a holding by city. 
— Insufficient. 
Establishment of a holding by drainage district. 
Estoppel. 
— Affirmative acts. 
— Denied. 
Establishment of a holding by city. 
— Insufficient. 
The city must have some semblance of title, 
action and had not paid any taxes thereon since 
1932 and defendants held possession under an 
apparent claim of right adversely to plaintiffs 
for more than seven years by grazing sheep 
thereon, the validity of the tax deed being 
immaterial. Cope v. Bountiful Livestock Co., 13 
Utah 2d 20, 368 P.2d 68 (1962). 
possession or right to use, and making a survey, 
destruction of a fence between the street and 
adjoining property, and verbal assertion of own-
ership by the city are not sufficient to establish 
a holding. Gibbons v. Salt Lake City Corp., 6 
Utah 2d 219, 310 R2d 513 (1957). 
Establishment of a holding by drainage 
district. 
The evidence indicated that land held by the 
Utah County Drainage District Number 1 was 
for public use and, therefore, could not be 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Utah's C.J.S. — 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 138; 
Short Statutes of Limitation for Tax Titles: The 85 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 984, 985. 
Continuing Specter of Lyman v. National Mori- Key Numbers. — Adverse Possession «» 
gage Bond Corp. — A Need for Remedial Leg- 79(4); Taxation «=» 805(4). 
islation, 1976 B.Y.U L. Rev. 457. 
Am. Jur. 2cL — 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse 
Possession § 165 et seq. 
78-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held 
by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for 
public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any 
other public purpose, by adverse possession thereof for any length of time 
whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or 
county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, 
and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and 
that for more than seven years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, 
his grantees or successors in interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous 
and adverse possession of such real estate; in which case an adverse title may 
be acquired. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943, Disposal of unused rights of way, § 27-12-97. 
Supp., 104-12-13. Highways continue until abandoned, § 27-
Cross-References, — Dedication of streets, 12-90. 
§ 57-5-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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